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ABstrACt
This research article deals with 1) logical definition 
2) definitions of the Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga (Definition 
on the Training Rules) (SVBH) and the Pãdabhãjanĩya 
(Classification of Words) (PBH) of the four Pãrãjikas of 
the bhikkhu’s discipline and 3) a synthesis of SVBH and 
PBH with the definition principle so as to evaluate them 
with the Theravãda Buddhist philosophical  outlook. There are 
two categories of definition: real definition and nominal 
definition. The former explains the essential meaning of 
words while the latter explains the verbal meaning. A good 
definition must be equivalent in meaning between definiendum, 
the term to be defined, and definiens, the defining term. 
For instance, an offence involving expulsion from a Buddhist 
monkhood is called Pãrãjikas (Defeat). There are 
four Pãrãjikas out of 237 Sikkhãpada (training rules) 
formulated by the Buddha for training behavior of 
bhikkhus. The four Pãrãjikas consist of six segments 
embodied as the training rules, one of which is the SVBH 
& PBH. The definition of words in the four Pãrãjikas is 
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related to the SVBH and the classification used to define 
them more is related to the PBH. There are 379 definitions 
in total used in SVBH & PBH: 0.5% are real definition and 
99.5% are nominal  definition. It could be asserted that 
definitions in the SVBH & PBH are all nominal because 
they state something natural, though their 0.5% might be 
understood as  real  definition. This is compatible with 
the Theravãda Buddhist philosophy that rejects anything 
‘supernatural’ in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. 
introduction
Based on the Buddha’s statements in the Kãlãmasutta Kangkhãni-
yatthãna “Be not led by mere logic, nor after considering reasons” (The 
Book of the Gradual Sayings, Vol. I, 1995: 172), there is a misunderstanding 
that Buddhism does not attach any importance to logic. But in fact, the 
core essence of Kãlãmasutta focuses on teaching people not to accept 
anything without examination and pondering. Therefore, we are justified 
in looking more closely into the Kãlamãsutta and its understanding and 
use of logic.  
In fact, the Tipitaka consists of logical themes such as deduction, 
induction, division, classification, fallacy and definition. This is evidence 
which confirms that human beings, no matter what culture they belong to, 
or what historical period, are rational beings, that is, they know how to 
employ logical thought. Or as stated over thousand years ago by Aristotle 
that man is a “rational animal” (Aristotle,1999: I.13)
Among the three scriptures of the Tipitaka, the Vinaya Pitaka is 
considered the most important one as it is the basis of Buddhism. What 
is more interesting in terms of logic is the segments called SVBH & PBH 
of Sikkhãpada, particularly the first three sections  – the four Pãrãjikas, 
the thirteen Sanghadisesas (An offence entailing initial and subsequent 
meeting of the Sangha), and the two Aniyatas (Undetermined offences) 
under the Patimokkha (Fundamental Rules of the Order). G. S. P.Misra 
has spoken of the role of definition in the Vinaya: 
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In logical formulation and discussions it is an essential 
thing that the exact meaning of each and every word used 
should be laid down in a precise manner. The authors of 
these early Buddhist texts made sincere efforts toward 
giving dictionary-type definitions of words. The Vibhaṅga 
of the Vinaya is replete with definitions which are in nature 
not very different from those given in modern dictionaries.” 
(Misra, 1984: 158)
This means it has placed importance on the meaning of language 
which is similar to the Greek philosophers of the same period and prior 
to what we now understand as the linguistic turn in philosophy. It is clear 
that the definitions in the SVBH & PBH have developed the Buddhist 
philosophical outlook in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics 
based upon the importance of definition.
Realizing the role of the logic shown in the Tipitaka above, 
I intend on examining the definitions of early Buddhist texts, especially the 
segments called the SVBH & PBH of the four Pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s 
discipline through a philosophical approach. 
A Logical Definition
Definition is a procedure that explains meanings of words and 
involves two elements, namely, definiendum, the term to be defined, and 
definiens, the defining term (Reese, W.L., 1980: 121) The definiendum 
may be compared to the subject, while the definiens may be compared 
to the predicate as in the categorical proposition of Aristotelian logic. 
Although both, definitions and categorical propositions have similar 
structures, they are not the same thing because the former emphasize 
only the meaning of a term/word while the latter focuses on the fact of a 
statement. Nevertheless, the use of definition is very helpful for categorical 
Syllogistic reasoning because if the predicate used to explain the subject 
in a categorical proposition has the right meaning, it will not only make 
a proposition truthful, but will also make such a Syllogistic reasoning in 
valid form more trustworthy.  
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In the history of Western philosophy, a systematic development of 
definition took place when Socrates had applied the dialectical method to 
find the meaning of such words such as piety, justice, wisdom and courage. 
Plato understood that a concept is something essential which lies behind 
the terms or words. He calls these forms or ideas. Aristotle, while rejecting 
that these forms or ideas exist in their own world, has nevertheless accepted 
that there is some real essence. (Aristotle, 1994-2009 (b): Book 1, Part 4) 
The modern philosopher John Locke shares Aristotle’s view when he is 
of the opinion that there is a “real constitution of substances, upon which 
depends this nominal essence”. (Locke, 2014: iii. Vi. 2). Although their 
thoughts are different in some points, philosophers as varied as Immanuel 
Kant, David Hume, Edmund Husserl, Heinrich Rickert and G. E. Moore, 
can be considered as essentialists. (Abelson, 1972: 316). The difference 
between the real essence and the nominal essence is a topic which has 
been debated in the Western philosophical tradition, and has become the 
source of the distinction between the real definition and nominal definition 
in later years. The following quotation expresses succinctly the difference 
between the two definitions:
…to discover the real  definition of a term XX one needs to 
investigate the thing or things denoted by XX; to discover 
the nominal  definition, one needs to investigate the meaning 
and use of XX  (Gupta, 2015:2)
For example, when Socrates asks “What is virtue?” he is asking 
for a clear meaning of this word by explaining its root and synonyms. 
On one hand it is a nominal definition, but since it deals with virtue as an 
ethical ideal, it can be regarded as a concept or a real definition. There are 
various types of real definition and nominal definition. The type of real 
definition which is generally known is Aristotle’s “definition by genus 
and specific difference”1 (Smith, 2015:13), for instance: 
• A triangle is a geometric shape with three straight sides.
• A human being is a rational animal. 
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The terms “triangle” and “human being” are the definiendum, 
“geometric shape” and “animal” are the genus, while “three straight 
sides” and “rational” are the specific difference. A nominal definition2, is 
definition by etymology, by synonyms,  by examples, and by description, 
for instance: 
• Philosophy derives from Greek language, i.e. philo “loving” 
+ sophia “knowledge”, so Philosophy is love of knowledge. 
(by etymology) 
• Philosophy is philosophia. (by synonym) 
• Southeast Asian countries are Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei etc. 
(by example) 
•   The Police are the ones who protect public peace (by description)3 
Definitions are an important part of logic because when one 
starts to argue, his/her premises must be clear. Only in this way can the 
argument be sound argument. This could be exemplified by Aristotle’s 
Syllogistic logic thus:
The one who completes bachelor degree is a graduate. 
Somchai is the one who completes a bachelor degree.
Therefore, Somchai is a graduate.  
The truth of the conclusion “Somchai is a graduate,” depends 
on the truth of the second premise “Somchai is the one who completes 
a bachelor degree,” but also important is the truth of the first premise 
(or the concept) “One who completes bachelor degree is a graduate.”
Hence, to make our concept clear out of each issue, one needs 
to have definition. Though there are many principles of good definition, 
the important one is definiendum and definiens which must be equivalent 
or can be replaceable with its meaning remaining the same such as the 
definition of “graduate”, “Graduate means the one who completes a bachelor 
degree.” In reverse, it can be said “The one who completes a bachelor 
degree is a graduate”. Once the definition is made as such, the concept 
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of the informant has become clear-cut and cannot be understood in 
any other way. Or as Morris R. Cohen. and Ernest Nagel have claimed 
over this rule of a good definition from the book entitled “Principia 
Mathemathica” by A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell thus:
…a definition of this type is written by putting the definiendum 
to the left and the definiens to the right with the sign of 
equality between them and the letters “Df.” to the right 
of the definiens. Thus implication, symbolized by ⊃, 
is defined thus: p ⊃ q = p’ V q. Df. Or, in words, “p implies q” 
is equivalent by definition to “not p or q.” (Cohen and Nagel, 
1978: 238)
However, criticisms of Real Definition had taken place since 
the 17th century, with the development of science, starting with Francis 
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. At present, some philosophers have applied 
logical method of language analysis which resulted in refusal of real 
essence. Bertrand Russell called the belief in existence of an essence as 
“a hopelessly muddle–headed notion” (Russell, 1948 :187), while Richard 
Robinson writes:
 
They (real and nominal  definitions) are too central to 
the history of man’s philosophical reflections and logical 
theories. They are ubiquitous and fundamental in the 
sources of Western philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. The 
concept of definition arose in the complex and confused 
form represented by the phrase ‘real definition’, not in the 
simple and clear form represented by the phrase ‘nominal 
definition’. We shall have, therefore, constantly to use the 
term ‘real definition’ in referring to past literature and 
studying the history of thought. My suggestion is only that 
we should no longer use it in writing philosophy ourselves. 
(Robinson, 1972: 191
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his “Philosophical Investigations” 
(1986) asserted that the meaning of language depends on a context of 
usage, while the meaning of terms is to be realized through ostentation 
(Part 1, 43). This means to say that Wittgenstein has rejected the essence 
or real meaning of terms. In addition, Wittgenstein also viewed that 
ostensive definition, which is nominal definition, enables us to know 
only the terms and not the meaning of terms (Part 1, 26-34). Wittgenstein 
refuses to define every term except when it is necessary to prevent 
misunderstanding (Part 1, 87), so language, according to its context of 
usage, has a flexible meaning because the language itself is a form of 
life and helps us understand the meaning of words in various contexts. 
In conclusion, Wittgenstein has dismissed real definition, viewing that if 
there needs to be a definition, we may use ostentation (ostensive definition), 
which is a kind of nominal definition. 
 John Hospers believed that if anybody wants to define a thing 
or the real essence, it should not be called definition at all, but should 
rather be regarded as “analysis of a thing, either the chemical analysis, 
or the conceptual analysis” (Hospers, 1983: 40). Besides, Hospers also 
viewed that in giving meaning to a term we cannot merely say that 
“Meaning is use” (22), because the word “use” is slippery in meaning. 
So, in making definition, we have to use equivalent terms both in terms 
of definiendum and definiens, so there will be no change in its meaning. 
“This is the most usual, most accepted and most “standard” sense of the 
word “definition” (22). Therefore, according to Hospers the definition of 
terms must be nominal definitions, not real ones, and when viewing from 
its equivalences, it should be definition by synonym rather than nominal 
definition, one by etymology or by example. 
Definition in the SVBH & PBH of the Four Pãrãjikas of 
the Bhikkhu’s discipline
The primary document of Theravãda Buddhism is the Tipitaka, 
consisting of three major scriptures i.e. the Vinaya Pitaka, the Suttanta 
Pitaka and the Abhidhamma Pitaka. The Vinaya Pitaka is a compilation 
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of Sikkhãpada of bhikkhus (monks) and bhikkhunis (nuns), consisting of 
three main parts i.e. Suttavibhaṁga (Classification of Rules), chapters 
concerning with the Sikkhãpada or 237 Disciplinary Rules  of  bhikkhus 
and 311 Disciplinary Rules of bhikkhunis; the Khandhaka (Division), 
chapters regarding details of Saṁghakamma or Saṁgha’s activities, 
routine practices, etiquettes, and general behavioral codes of bhikkhus 
and bhikkhunis; and the  Parivāra (Accessory), chapters comprised 
of a collection of questions and answers to facilitate teaching and 
understanding. In conclusion, the Vinaya Pitaka is consisted of two major parts: 
Adibrahmacãriyakasikkhã or a training for physical, verbal and mental 
practices which is primary one for strict practice of chastity called 
Sikkhãpada, and Abhisamacãrikasikkhã concerned with customs, 
etiquette, and the noble livelihood of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis. 
Sikkhãpada is a provision concerning prohibitions and approvals 
issued by the Buddha for bhikkhus and bhikkhunis concerning violations of 
proper conduct in the Sangha. These are likened to Articles or Sections of 
the law, but the difference is that it is meant for physical, verbal and mental 
training. If any violation takes place, “An action that violates, resulting 
from such provision and carries punishment over yourself called āpatti 
or an offence” (Somdejphramahãsamanajao Kromprayãvajirayãnvaroros, 
2523 (1979): 11). Most of Sikkhãpada consist of six segments as follows:
1. First Transgressor means a story of the first bhikkhu who 
behaves so badly that results in enactment of each Sikkhãpada by the 
Buddha
2. Act means Sikkhãpada that the Buddha had enacted to prevent 
bhikkhus and bhikkhunis from violation and a violator shall face an 
ecclesiastical punishment.
3. Sub-Act means additional acts enacted later to comprehensively 
cover the Sikkhãpada.
4. Sikkhãpadavibamga and Padabhãjaniya explains or defines 
significant terms in each Sikkhãpada more clearly, while any terms 
which are unclear and less comprehensive must be classified and defined 
additionally in the Padabhãjaniya.
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5. Anāpattivāra means exceptions which are not ecclesiastical 
offences.
6. Vinitavatthu means a study case of violation of Sikkhãpada 
which has been judged by the Buddha himself.
The four Pãrãjikas means Sikkhãpada which carry penalty for 
bhikkhus who violate any of the four Pãrãjikas as detailed below:
the first defeat
Whatever monk, possessed of the training and mode of life 
for monks, but not disavowing the training and not declaring 
his weakness, should indulge in sexual intercourse, 
even with an animal, is one who is defeated, he is not in 
communion. (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1: 41-42)
the second defeat
Whatever monk should by means of theft take from a village 
or from the jungle what has not been given to him in such 
manner of taking as kings, catching a thief in the act of 
stealing, would flog him or imprison him or banish him, 
saying, ‘You are a robber, you are foolish, you are wrong, 
you are a thief,’ –  even so a monk, taking what is not given 
him, is also one who is defeated, he is not in communion.” 
(The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:73)
the third defeat
Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human being 
of life or should look about so as to be his knife-bringer, 
or should praise the beauty of death, or should incite 
(anyone) to death, saying, ‘Hello there, my man of what 
use to you is this evil, difficult life? Death is better for you 
than life,’ or who should deliberately and purposefully in 
various ways praise the beauty of death or should incite 
(anyone) to death: he also is one who is defeated, he is not 
in communion. (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1: 125-126) 
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the fourth defeat
Whatever monk should boast, with reference to himself 
of a state of further-men, sufficient ariyan knowledge and 
insight, though not knowing it fully, and saying: ‘This 
I know, this I see,’ then if later on, he, being pressed or 
not being pressed, fallen, should desire to be purified, 
and should say: ‘Your reverence, I said that I know what 
I do not know, see what I do not see, I spoke idly, falsely, 
vainly,’ apart from the undue estimate of himself, he also 
is one who is defeated, he is not in communion. (The Book 
of Discipline. Vol. 1:159)
Any bhikkhu who violates any one of the four Pãrãjikas are 
considered the defeated, that is to say, they can no more prosper in the 
religion of the Lord Buddha, and have been compared to a man who is 
beheaded, yellow leaves that fell from the extreme end, a thick rock that 
was broken, and topless sugar-palm tree which cannot be deeply connected 
and grow as beautifully as previously did.
This is the same to most Sikkhãpada, the four Pãrãjikas comprise 
six segments especially segment on the SVBH &PBH which define or 
explain the content of four Pãrãjikas which is the core topic of this 
research. In brief, SVBH is the definition of the significant terms in each 
Sikkhãpada such as the definition of “Bhikkhu”, “indulges” and “sexual 
intercourse” etc. (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:47) of the first Pãrãjika. 
         PBH means classifying the defined terms in the SVBH making 
additional definition clearly and comprehensively.  For example, the 
second Pãrãjika has defined “‘What has not been given’ means what has 
not been given; nor granted, nor thrown away; what is guarded, protected, 
cherished, what belongs to others” (The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:74), 
but it does not give detail on type of property, so it needs to have the PBH 
to figure out that such property means what kind of property it covers.   
A study found that there was an explanation to define terms and 
phrases totaling 377 definitions. Once these definitions are synthesized 
into four Pãrãjikas, they can be classified as follows:
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Table 1:  Category & Type of Definitions Used in the SVBH &PBH
Category &Type of 
Definition
1st
defeat
2nd
defeat
3rd     
defeat
4th     
defeat total
per-
cent
1   Real  Definition                       
     By Genus & Specific   
     Difference                                     
     1
     (1)
0
(0)
      1
     (1)
0 
(0)
2 
(2)
0.5 
(0.5)
2.  Nominal Definition  
     By Synonym  
     By Example 
     By Description 
     By Synonym &  
Example                    
253
(243)
(10)
(0) 
(0)
56
(18)
(31)
(5)
(2)
38
(11)
(6)
(0)
(21)
30
(14)
(16)
(0)
(0)
377
(286)
(63)
(5)
(23)
99.5
(75.5)
(16.7)
(1.3)
(6.0)
Total 254(254) 56(56) 39(39) 30(30) 379(379) 100
Note: Number in bracket denotes type of definitions that fall in each category of 
definitions 
 
Among 379 definitions, 2 are real definitions (0.5%), 377 are 
nominal definitions (99.5%), out of which 286 are definition by 
synonym (75.5%), 63 are definitions by example (16.7%), 5 are definitions 
by description (1.3%), and 23 definitions are definitions by synonym 
–cum- example (6.0%).
Detailed points in the Table should be considered as follows:
1. 377 definitions are nominal definitions and 286 are definition 
by synonym. The definition by synonym is using the term with similar 
meaning to explain the definiendum. The following Tables are examples 
to characterize the popular definition by synonym:
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Table 2: Definition by Synonym in a dictionary style  
(term-by-term basis)
Definiendum Definiens source
Boat That by which one crosses Padabhãjanĩya, 2nd Defeat*
Being in a vehicle The goods are laid down in vehicle Padabhãjanĩya, 2nd Defeat*
An arranged thief A crowd having arranged together Padabhãjanĩya, 2nd Defeat**
(The Book of Discipline. Vol. 1:80-81*, 88**)
However, the definition by synonym in a dictionary style is used 
less than the one defined by approximate equivalent words as the definition 
of the term “monk” (bhikkhu) in the next Table.
Table 3: Definition by Synonym with approximate equivalent words
Definiendum Definiens source
Monk He is a monk because he is beggar for alms, 
a monk because he submits to wandering for 
alms, a monk because he is the one who wears 
the patchwork cloth, a monk by designation, 
a monk on account of his acknowledgement; 
a monk is called “Come, monk, a monk is 
endowed with going to the three refugees, a 
monk is auspicious, a monk is the essential, a 
monk is a learner, a monk is  an adept, a monk 
means one who is endowed with harmony of 
the Order, with the solution at which the 
motion is put three times and then followed 
by the decision is put three times, with actions, 
with steadfastness, with the attributes of a man 
perfected. 
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,
1st Defeat
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:42)  
Each definiens points to the same meaning of the term definiendum - 
monk.
Widya  Sakyabhinand   41
There is also definition by synonym with equivalent words that 
explain phrases instead of terms. It comprises 240 definitions. All define 
such phrases as “the declaration of weakness, the training not being 
disavowed” and “the declaration of weakness, the training being 
disavowed”. To take one example, the phrase “the declaration of weakness, 
the training not being disavowed,” has a definition runs as follows:
Table 4: Definition by Synonym to define phrase with approximate 
equivalent words
Definiendum Definiens source
The declaration  
of weakness,  
the training not 
being disavowed
The monk who is chafing, dissatisfied, desirous 
or passing from the state of a recluse, anxious, 
troubled and ashamed at being a monk, longing 
to be a householder, longing to be a  lay follower, 
longing to be a park (monastery) attendant, 
longing to be a  novice, longing to be another 
sect, longing to be a disciple of  another sect, 
longing not to be a recluse, longing not to be a 
son of the Sakyans-says, and declares: “What 
now I were to disavow the enlightened one?”
Padabhãjanĩya, 
1st Defeat
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:43)
Although the Buddhist definition by synonym exemplified in 
Table 3 and Table 4 is not in a dictionary style, it could also be understood 
as a definition by synonym seen in Western logic, coinciding with Rhys 
Davids’ view that using a group of overlapping synonyms can define a 
term, and should not be considered a fallacy as it would normally be in 
Western logic (Davids, 1993: xxxv). K. N. Jayatileke shares the same 
view by raising it in the context of Wittgenstein’s approach to language. 
We substantiate the meaning of a term through usage because each term 
has its meaning “by virtue of family resemblance” that the informant can 
infer in it. (Jayatilleke, 1980: 300).
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2. The second with 63 definitions in total is the definition by 
example. Unlike the definition by synonym which is mostly used in the 
first Sikkhãpada of the four Pãrãjikas, the definition by example is used 
in almost equal number of the four Pãrãjikas, especially used mostly in 
the second Sikkhãpada due to its connection to things like property and 
places. The definition by example is thus more clear:
Table 5: Definition by Example with property and places
Definiendum Definiens source
Village A village of one hut, and a village of two huts, 
and a village of three huts, and a village of 
four huts, and a village with human beings, 
and a village with  beings who are not human, 
and a fenced-in village, and a village which 
is not fenced in, and a village arranged 
fortuitously, and even a caravan that is camping 
for more than four months is called a village.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 
2nd Defeat*
King King of the earth, local king, king’s deputies, 
subordinate chieftains, judges, chief ministers; 
moreover those who administer torture and 
maiming are called kings
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga,  
2nd Defeat*
Park A park with flowers, a park with fruits Padabhãjanĩya, 
2nd Defeat**
(The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:74*, 82**)
 
 3. Another type of definition in the SVBH &PBH of the four 
Pãrãjikas are definitions which are both definition by synonym–cum-
by example, totaling 23 definitions, and most of them are 21 definitions 
belong to the third Pãrãjika:
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Table 6: Definition by Synonym–cum-by Example
Definiendum Definiens source
He praises by 
means of the 
body
He makes a gesture with the body, saying “Whatever 
dies thus receives wealth or receives glory or goes 
to heaven.”
Padabhãjanĩya,  
 3rd Defeat*
A support He puts a dagger in a support, or smears it with 
poison, or makes it weak, or he arranges it in a deep 
ravine, or a pit, or a steep precipice,  and says: “Falling 
down, he will die.”
Padabhãjanĩya,  
3rd Defeat**
Offering a 
sight
He arranges a dreadful sight, saying: “Seeing this 
frightful, horrible thing, and being terrified he will 
die.”
Padabhãjanĩya,  
 3rd Defeat**
 (The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:132*, 135**)
“He makes a gesture with the body” is synonym of “He praises 
by means of the body”, “Putting a dagger in a support” is synonym of 
 “A support”, and “Arranging of a dreadful sight” is synonym of “Offering 
a sight”, whereas the following statements are to set examples. 
4. There have been seven statements of the definition by description 
under the second Defeat, for example:
Table 7: Definition by Description
Definiendum Definiens source
The Jungle What remains leaving a side the village and 
the outskirts of the village.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 
2 nd Defeat*
A thief He  who takes by means of theft (anything) 
having the value of five māsakas or more 
than five māsakas that has not been given.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 
2 nd Defeat**
A field Where grain and pules are produced. Padabhãjanĩya, 
2 nd Defeat***
 (The Book of Discipline.Vol.1:74*, 75**, 83***)
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5. Of the total 379 definitions, definitions, there are 2 places that 
should be called “Real Definition”. They are as follows: 
Table 8: Real Definition by Genus and Specific Difference
Definiendum Definiens source
Sexual 
intercourse
What is not verily dhamma, village dhamma, 
low caste dhamma. wickedness, the final 
ablution, secrecy, between couples.
Sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 
1st Defeat*
Human being (The body)4 from the mind first arising, 
from (the time of) consciousness becoming 
first manifest in a mother’s womb until the 
time of death.
Padabhãjanĩya, 
3rd Defeat***
 (The  Book of Discipline.Vol.1:47*, 87**,126***)
That it is regarded as Real Definition because “dhamma (tradition)”, 
and “the body” are raised as a genus for classification, whereas the following 
terms/phrases, namely, “not verily, village, low caste , wickedness, the 
final ablution, secrecy, and having in couples” are employed as  specific 
differences for “sexual intercourse”; and “ the mind first arising, from (the 
time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until 
the time of death” are employed as specific differences of “the body”.
discussion 
1. Among the 379 definitions, there are some definitions which are 
interestingly close to the use of definition in the modern English Dictionary. 
Or as G. S. P. Misra’ words, “The authors of these early Buddhist texts 
made sincere efforts toward giving dictionary-type definitions of words. 
The Vibhanga of the Vinaya is replete with definitions which are in nature 
not very different from those given in modern dictionaries.” (1984:158). 
Hence we will compare the definition of the same word in the SVBH 
&PBH from “The Book of the Discipline, Vol.1” (1992) with that from 
“Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English” (2009), for example :
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Table 10 : Example of Comparative Definitions
The Book of  
the Discipline
thief means he  who takes by means of theft (anything) having 
the value of five māsakas or more than five māsakas that has not 
been given. (75)
Longman 
Dictionary
thief means someone who steel things from another person  
or place. (1831)
The Book of the 
Discipline
Boat means that by which one crosses. (80)
Longman 
Dictionary
Boat means a vehicle that travels across water. (171)
The Book of  
the Discipline
A field means where grain and pules are produced. (83)
Longman 
Dictionary
A field means an area of land in the country, especially one 
where crops are grown or animals feed on grass. (636)
The Book of  
the Discipline
intentionally means a transgression committed knowingly, 
consciously, deliberately. (126)
Longman 
Dictionary
intentionally means done deliberately and usually intended to 
cause harm. (917)
However, the definitions of the SVBH &PBH of the four Pãrãjikas 
and of Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English has significant 
differences due to the contextual differences of words. The first one had 
been used 2,500 years ago in the context of each Pãrãjika, while the one 
under Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English is the definition 
that covers all current contexts of words, so it has multiple meanings as 
shown in the dictionary. 
2. Among 379 definitions, only two of them can be considered real 
definition in terms of definition by genus and specific difference, but not a 
real definition in terms of an abstract intangible truth which is supernatural. 
These are empirical truths because the two definitions i.e., “Sexual 
intercourse means what is not verily dhamma, etc”, and “Human being 
means the body from the mind first arising, from (the time of) consciousness 
becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death.” 
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These examples remain under the realm of nature which corresponds to 
the viewpoints of Phra Phromkunaporn (P. A. Payutto) (2555 (2012): 166 
-167) and Kalupahana, (1982:19) that what we understand as supernatural 
is a natural thing, but due to its being complicated and unattainable, it is 
then viewed as supernatural and miraculous. It may be for this reason 
that Theravãda Buddhism did not develop a variety of definitions as 
did by Western Philosophy, especially Definition by genus and specific 
difference, in order to find an essence or real meaning of a term. However, 
the two definitions which appear in the SVBH &PBH which correspond 
to the definition by genus and specific difference could agree through a 
typical usage of language. 
3. Based on the reasons in No.2 and with 377 definitions (99.5%) 
being the nominal definition, suggests that in Theravãda Buddhism there 
are no real definitions which would indicate abstract or supernatural things, 
and this applies to abstract concepts as well. Real meaning should be 
one type of nominal meaning which agrees with what Hongladarom calls 
“the abstract  object  that can be analyzed” (Hongladarom: 2555 (2012): 43), 
so only the nominal meaning should be the meaning of language because 
the main function of language that holds the logical value is its informative 
function (Copi, 1978: 56), if the receiver understands  the information, 
whether the communication is true or false, it can be considered that the 
function of language is accomplished. 
To assert that only the nominal definition exists not only coincides 
with the Theravãda Buddhist metaphysics which does not believe in 
anything supernatural, but also coincides with the Theravãda Buddhist 
epistemology and ethics as stated in the Majjhimanikãya:
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of 
eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory 
impingement, feelings are because of sensory impingement; 
what one feels one perceives; what one perceives one 
reasons about; what one reasons about obsesses one; what 
obsesses one is the origin of the number of perceptions 
and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material 
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shapes cognizable by the eye, past, future, present. (Other 
consciousness that arises from the contacts between ear 
and sounds, nose and smells, tongue and tastes, body and 
touches and mind and mental objects, has been described 
in the same way). (The Middle Length Sayings, Vol.1., 
1992: 145)  
According to the Majjhimanikãya mentioned above, when the 
sense-organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind) converge with 
the sense-objects (form, sound, smell, taste, tangible objects and mind- 
objects), there arises consciousness or perception (epistemology). After 
this follows the positive or negative behavior called an action or kamma 
towards perception through three channels of action – bodily, verbal, and 
mental (ethics). Hence according to the kamma principle as the basis of 
human’s behavior, human language is a verbal action which expresses 
facts of human activity, and this language should communicate nominal 
meaning. So according to the Theravãda Buddhist philosophical outlook, 
the definition in the SVBH & PBH of the four Pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s 
discipline should be understood only by nominal definition. 
Natural Things
Nominal Definition
Real Definition
Therefore, with all mentioned above, the features of definition in 
the SVBH & PBH of the four Pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline can 
be concluded in the following illustration. 
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Conclusion and suggestions
The 379 definitions that have been taken from the SVBH & PBH for 
analysis reflect an overall view of Theravãda Buddhist Philosophy on the 
problem of meaning in language. They show that philosophical approaches 
to linguistic meaning such as “meaning is use”, “nominal meaning” and 
“real meaning” can be understood from a Buddhist perspective. What 
Theravãda Buddhist philosophy emphasizes would be nominal meaning, 
because the so-called real meaning, according to the Buddhist viewpoint, 
would be just another form of the nominal meaning. Therefore, if we go 
through the Buddhist scriptures and encounter metaphysical words such 
as nibbãna, kamma, dhamma. vinnãna, jhãna and samsãra, we should 
understand them in the sense of nominal meaning.
However, much more work needs to be done. A study of the 
definitions of the SVBH & PBH which would allow us to develop a 
Theravãda Buddhist position on the nominal definition still requires more 
comparative study of scriptures of the Tipitaka, or between the scriptures 
of Tipitaka and their commentaries. It is also important to study the use 
of abstract definition which explains dhamma topics in the Abhidhamma 
Pitaka. This would allow us to understand the Theravãda Buddhist 
refusal of the Western concept of real definition. Also important would be 
the comparison of the use of definition in the Tipitaka on specific topics 
with the definitions of the Thai Dictionary of the Office of Royal Society, 
or with English dictionaries to develop an awareness on the precise 
meaning of words for the right understanding of the Buddha’s teachings.
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endnotes
 1 Another type of Aristotle’s Real  Definition which is not included here and 
could be regarded as another form of Definition by Genus and Specific Difference is the 
Definition by Cause. It states the genus of the term by substituting specific difference 
with a  cause. A cause is something material, formal, efficient and final for its existence. 
(Aristotle,1994-2009(a): Part 3)
2 Excerpted from : 1. Baum (1975: 429-456), 2. Copi (1978: 126-154), 3. Moore 
and Parker (1992:28-31) and 4. Porter (2002 : 43-63)
3 This definition takes a logical property of a term to describe the definiendum.
4 The term “body” is introduced here as a genus to facilitate our classification 
because the Pali term “viggaha” in the compound word “manussaviggaham” (translated 
as “human being”) could also mean “the body” (attabhavam). See :1) Samantapasadika, 
Vol. II, (1969:437) which explains the term “manussaviggaham” as “manussattabhavam” 
(human body) and 2) Davids and Stede (1975: 615). The term “body” has denotative 
meaning as the genus in the sense that it refers to either living or dead body etc.
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